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SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE: GENOCIDE LAW 
AS EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE OBJECT 
TAWIA ANSAI-1* 
ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes the discourse on genocide 
from two angles: the legal genesis of the term in the 
1940s and subsequent legal "capture" of the 
concept of genocide, and a recent socio-political 
critique of the legal meaning of genocide. The 
article suggests that a cross-disciplinary critique of 
genocidal violence not only describes the event and 
the victim, but also produces knowledge of them as 
discursive "objects." The key issue is the 
"surveillance" role of the outside observer, also 
produced as such in discursive relation to the 
object. At stake in this view of genocide law as 
epistemology is the capacity to reimagine law in 
order to help us make hard choices about how, 
whether, and when to intervene in events that may 
be characterized as genocide. 
INTRODUCTION: ELEMENTS OF MEANING 
The French philosopher Alain Badiou begins his book, The 
Century,' with a quotation from Jean Genet. Badiou asks: "What is 
a century? I have in mind Jean Genet's preface to his play, The 
Blacks.2 In it, [Genet] asks ironically: 'What is a black man?' 
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School of Law. Professor of Law, New England Law I Boston. I thank the Board 
of Trustees at New England for a summer stipend. My thanks to Colin Perrin, 
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2 JEAN GENET, THE BLACKS: A CLOWN SHOW (Bernard Frechtman trans., Grove 
Press 1960). 
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Adding at once: 'And first of all, what colour is he?'"3 Badiou 
assumes Genet asks the question ironically, as if the answer should 
be obvious, and he poses the question through Genet because the 
meaning of "a century" would seem to be obvious too, at first 
appearance. But of course, it is not. 
This semantic query is the point of departure for the current 
analysis of genocide law. The meaning of the term would seem to 
be obvious; indeed, at a recent conference, when mention was 
made of the current undertaking, the response was: "But everyone 
knows the meaning of genocide. The question is whether or not 
legally it applies to the facts, isn't it?" This article suggests that 
what seems obvious about genocide is in fact the very thing that is 
deceptive. Genocide as the name and specification of a category of 
violence provides us with a kind of knowledge, an epistemology, 
about the world and about ourselves that hides certain truths. 
This article will argue that genocide law—the legal nomination 
of forms of violence as genocide and what we mean by that 
nomination—has engendered a discourse on global violence. This 
discourse, I suggest, reinforces ways of separating the world into 
political subjects and apolitical objects. The former reside within a 
world where the violence of genocide is deemed to be radically 
absent. The latter live with the constant threat of genocidal 
violence; put otherwise, the objects of the discourse are susceptible 
to genocidal violence. Genocide describes the state of violence or 
anomie within whose proximity they live. 
The argument goes further to suggest that genocide as a 
discourse—much like the concept of race at the height of Western 
imperialism in the nineteenth century that genocide discourse 
inherits—maintains this division between humans at an almost 
immutable level. Indeed, race discourse has reinforced the 
normative underpinnings of genocide; as Badiou puts it, "we 
cannot but recognize, the unceasing burden of questions of race" 
when considering some of the central issues that animated the last 
century's movements and innovations, from law and politics to 
morality and economics.4 The reinforcement of this division 
between subjects and objects operates at an institutional level (i.e. 
through domestic and international juridical bodies) as a political 
form of governance. The law axiomatically enforces the 
maintenance of political forms. The law on genocide is itself, as 
epistemology, a political form of governance. 
3 BADIOU, supra note 1, at I. 
4 BADIOU, supra note I, at 15. 
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This article describes and analyzes the origins of the law on 
genocides from an interdisciplinary perspective. It looks at the 
genesis of the term as a legal, political, sociological, and cultural 
event. The word's origins will be examined with a view to 
outlining the legal and other elements of meaning that have come 
to characterize the subsequent discourse. My aim is to show the 
production of those elements as the knowledge of genocide within 
its historically situated moment. 
The first task will be to think about what the "inventor" of the 
term, Raphael Lemkin, meant by the term he coined. In 
undertaking that analysis, I deploy something like a linguistic or 
genealogical methodology to look at three things: first, what 
Lemkin says about the term; second, how Lemkin's words are 
generic, in the sense that they reflect certain cultural strains 
specific to the time and the context (mid-twentieth century Europe, 
the World War, the backdrop of European imperialism, and so on); 
and third, the interpretation of Lemkin's words or intentions with 
respect to the meaning of genocide from a modern, post-legal 
perspective. The latter, in its management of the latent and 
suppressed cultural-historical strains within Lemkin's formulation, 
highlights the policing elements of the discourse on genocide. 
As noted earlier, the law on genocide polices the categorization 
of humans in relation to violence; the primary division is between 
the political subject and the apolitical object of the discourse. 
Within the latter half of the twentieth century, that division 
coalesced around a dichotomy between the global North and South 
in their relationship to violence (and to each other). Genocide 
discourse, as epistemology and representation, produces a sense of 
the object and a way of knowing the world. Interrogating that sense 
and that production will help us to make the hard legal and 
political choices about whether, how, and when to intervene in a 
global crisis event. 
I. LEMKIN: GENOCIDE AS LAW 
The term genocide, as noted earlier, was coined by Raphael 
Lemkin in his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of 
Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress.6 Here 
is the passage that defines and explains the meaning of the term: 
5 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. 
Res. 260A (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/260111[A-C] (Dec. 9, 1948). 
6 RAPHAFL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION, 
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS (1944). 
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New conceptions require new terms. By "genocide" 
we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group. This new word, coined by the author to 
denote an old practice in its modern development, is 
made from the ancient Greek word genos (race, 
tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus 
corresponding in its formulation to such words as 
tyrannicide, homocide [sic], infanticide, etc. 
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily 
mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except 
when accomplished by mass killings of all members 
of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a 
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of 
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves.7 
Lemkin's book is a compilation and analysis of "the texts of 
laws and decrees of the Axis Powers, and of their puppet regimes, 
issued for the government of areas occupied by their military 
forces in Europe."8 Lemkin discusses a little-considered example 
of the concept of genocide as destruction, rather than simply mass 
killing: in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, Lemkin notes that "[i]n 
other countries, especially in Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg, 
genocide in the economic field was carried out . . . ."9 Lemkin did 
not distinguish between incorporated and occupied territories 
under the Nazis, except with respect to the techniques of genocide. 
Lemkin named several means by which genocide was effectuated: 
political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, 
and moral.") Otherwise, the laws of occupation per se entailed the 
practice of genocide throughout Europe. 
Lemkin's definition, then, seems to emphasize a process rather 
than simply an end result or product (death). It is a process whose 
aim is destruction of a group that Lemkin conceives of as a 
national entity. But the definition deploys various tropes that are 
embedded within the words Lemkin uses. That is, these words 
have their own historical, mythical or narrative implications: genos 
as "race, tribe," for instance, and the idea of a "new" term to 
7 Id. at 79 (italics in original). 
Id. at 82. 
9 Id. at 86. 
10 Id. at 82-90. 
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describe an "old" experience in its "modern" form. Indeed, the 
form that the word struggles to define is itself a "reversion." 
Lemkin's definition is progressivist in that it invites the 
perception that legal definition—of a form of violence that seemed 
to have marked the conflicts of his time—is the means of a 
progression or escape from that form of violence: from tribalism to 
nation, from (mere) death, implying arbitrary violence, to 
destruction and its coordinated processes. But the very 
progressivism of the definition suggests also an inner ambivalence. 
It is as if Lemkin saw the law and the legal specification and 
calibration of violence as salvific. Lemkin's definition of genocide, 
the "new" term, held the promise of hope for the end of this form 
of violence, not just its juridical management (i.e. as a form of 
justice). 
The element of salvation (law as salvific) may also be seen in 
the reading of genocide's generic" meaning as related to identity. 
That is, Lemkin's conception of law as generically salvific—or 
within the genre of salvation discourses—is evident at various 
points within his text. For instance, invoking the traditional 
division of the world into civilized nations and barbarous races, 
Lemkin seems to have some difficulty conceptualizing the 
Germans who are, after all, a civilized (and civilizing) people. The 
dilemma is resolved in the dream of positive law as law only when 
expressive of morality, and further resolved through a strict and 
essentialist moral hierarchy between the belligerents on the basis 
of identity. 
Of the Allies, Lemkin notes in his preface that, "the author 
feels that such evidence [of the laws of occupation] is especially 
necessary for the Anglo-Saxon reader, who, with his innate respect 
for human rights and human personality, may be inclined to 
believe that the Axis regime could not possibly be as cruel and 
ruthless as it has been hitherto described."I2 In the same vein, he 
collects all Germans together and insists that the issue of war and 
the abuses committed are "the responsibility of the German people 
treated as an entirety,"I3 since all have benefited: "Indeed, all 
I I By "generic" I mean conventional, but this also indexes "genocide" as 
constitutive of other generic discourses specific to the time: on race, tribalism, 
barbarism, violence, imperialism, the law, and so on. For an analysis of genre as 
discourse, see, e.g., JOHN FROW, GENRE (Routledge 2006) and TZVETAN 
TODOROV, GENRES IN DISCOURSE (Catherine Porter trans., Cambridge 1990). 
12 LEmKIN, supra note 6, at ix. 
13 Id. at xiii. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
36 	 JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW 	 [voL. 3.031 
groups of the German nation had their share in the spoils of 
occupied Europe."14 
In contrast to the "innate" morality of the Anglo-Saxon, he 
characterizes the Germans' militarism as "the most virulent 
because it is based upon a highly developed national and racial 
emotionalism . . . ."15 Lemkin then suggests that "[t]he United 
Nations in the present war are faced with a tremendous task: to 
destroy this amalgamation of master-race mythology and 
aggressive technology which makes of the German people a kind 
of technified myth that stupefies the world . . . . [T]he Germans 
will be impelled to replace their theory of master race by a theory 
of a master morality, international law, and true peace."16 
Traversing the legal conception of the new crime of genocide is 
this morality play with its mythic archetypes: the morally innocent 
Anglo-Saxon and the militant Teuton. It may well be that 
Lemkin's characterization here, a minor rhetorical aside in an 
otherwise dispassionate and detailed account of the German laws 
of occupation, was motivated by a flattering appeal to his (Allied) 
readership."  But these marginal references nonetheless express 
stereotypes of the time: the Anglo-Saxon is "innately" moral, 
notwithstanding the ravages of Britain's imperial wars, which are 
rationalized as the duty of empire and the "white man's burden"18 
and, as such, not militaristic in the pejorative sense. And the 
Germans had, after all, twice in the same century "stupefied" the 
world with the arrogance of their martial ambitions in the East. 
Thus, the conception of genocide imports, through these marginal 
references, a way to resolve the projection of a civilized nation as 
militaristic: the practice of genocide is the reversion19 of the 
civilized nation to an ancient barbarism in modern, technified 
form. 
It is possible to see here the intimation of a division between 
civilization and state violence (displaced, on one level, by calling it 
"barbarism"), as well as between the law's morality (moral 
content) and law's other. The myth's stupefying power, within the 
text, inheres in an implicit denial of a barbaric violence ascribed to 
the modern nation-state, even as there is a repressive strain 
14 Id. at xiv. 
15 Id 
16 1d. 
17  I am grateful to Kenneth Ledford for this observation. 
Rudyard Kipling, The White Man's Burden, in THE WHITE MAN'S BURDENS: 
AN ANTHOLOGY OF BRITISH POETRY OF THE EMPIRE (Chris Brooks & Peter 
Faulkner eds., Exeter 1996) (1899). 
19 Id. at 80. 
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attributed to the law's civilizing narrative: to destroy, to impel. The 
generic story of moral innocence elides or suppresses that strain. 
Thus, Lemkin's text harbors the law's own self-repression of its 
violence, deflected as the barbarism of a militant other, or 
militancy as other to law. The boundary between the law, 
expressed by the moral and liberatory forces of the Allies, and its 
other expressed in the "German juggernaut," is enforced through 
archetypes of innocence: the Anglo-Saxon is untainted here by the 
idea of a militant master-race "myth" of his own. 
The price paid for this innocence of the modern nation-state is 
to dehistoricize the very idea of state violence. Hence, Lemkin 
notes that "[i]t required a long period of evolution in civilized 
society to mark the way from wars of extermination, which 
occurred in ancient times and in the Middle Ages, to the 
conception of wars as being essentially limited to activities against 
armies and states.2° As examples of "wars of extermination," 
Lemkin cites to the "special wholesale massacres" of Genghis 
Khan and the "odious scourges of Tamerlane [sic]," as well as the 
destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in AD 72.2  As a throwback to 
this period, genocide seems strangely otherworldly and out of time. 
The effect of this is also to locate the legal origins of the law's 
dominion over violence, or at least that of genocide, in the farthest 
reaches of history, or, like myth, within a timeless frame. At once, 
therefore, the violence of this war is conceived within the legal 
framework, as generic discourse, as out of time and of history. 
Lemkin goes on to describe genocide as the aim to destroy a 
nation or group through a two-tiered process: first, the destruction 
or eradication of the "national characteristics" of the group, and 
second, the imposition of the "national characteristics" of the 
oppressor or occupier22. It is noteworthy that the target group be a 
nation, or have some national status: the definition of genocide 
(quoted above) conceives of a progression from tribal to national 
violence. Thus, although in its content it is an ancient form of 
violence, in form—or in formal legal terms—genocide could occur 
only after the rise of the nation-state within European history. If we 
imagine the beginning of the rule of law to be the beginning of 
history, as suggested by Paul W. Kahn,23 and the beginning of 
20 Id. at 80. 
21 Id. at 80 n.3. 
22 Id. at 80. 
23 PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 17 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1999) ("History begins with a communal 
act of will, imposing a reasonable order on self and polity. This is the beginning 
of law's rule."). 
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history to be the rise of the nation-state, as argued by Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri,24 then the idea that genocide is a 
phenomenon of the nation-state rehistoricizes this hitherto barbaric 
and ancient form of violence; that is, genocide occurs within 
history, specifically modem history, and occurs within the rule of 
law. 
The idea of genocide as temporal and historical is further 
reinforced in another footnote where Lemkin suggests that 
"[a]nother term could be used for the same idea [as genocide], 
namely, ethnocide, consisting of the Greek word `ethnos'-
nation—and the Latin word `cide.'"25 A connection, then, is forged 
between the ideas of race and nation. The latter takes on some of 
the originary, tribal sense of the former. As such, ancient wars of 
extermination and modem genocide are seen as continuous, linked 
together as "blood wars," yet severed temporally by the advent of 
law. There may have been "wars of extermination" in the past, but 
genocide could only occur in a culture determined by laws, with 
the nation-state marking both the inauguration of the civilized 
order, the break with a primitive world and, at the same time, 
marking the origins of the possibility of genocide. 
But as with all generic discourse, there is within this original 
formulation of genocide a paradox: on the one hand, genocide is a 
modem phenomenon, nation against nation; on the other hand, the 
civilized nation reverts to an ancient practice from which primitive 
state it has long since evolved. In the former, genocide represents 
the people as nation (ethnos); in the latter, genocide indexes the 
people as tribe (genos). Reversion itself thus suggests something 
ancient, even atemporal, about the nation-state. This leads to a 
legal resolution of the paradox. Coupled with the story of 
innocence—of the Allies, through the elision of their own myths of 
racial and moral superiority—two things are reinforced by the idea 
of genocide as reversion. One is that the link between nation and 
race suggests continuity, in that some nations (the Allies) are 
inherently incapable of the barbarism to which others (the 
Germans, in this instance) naturally, militaristically, revert. The 
other thing reinforced is this idea of something original, even 
cosmic, about the struggle in Europe, which emphasizes the 
timeless, ahistorical sense in which this original conception of 
genocide is framed. 
24 MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 4 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) 
(history of the modern nation-state began with the Peace of Westphalia). 
-5 LEMKIN, supra note 6, at 79 n. I. 
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Once more, therefore, the genre of legal discourse on violence, 
indexed in the margins of Lemkin's text, enables an escape from 
the apparent contradiction of a link between a civilized order and 
mass, exterminatory violence by displacing that violence—and as 
such, the nation as civilized self—outside of time. The "nation" is 
by definition incapable of destructive violence on this scale. 
In the space vacated by law's violence we see the operation of a 
progressive yet static (timeless) idea of law, a regime that 
precipitated the end of ancient barbarism. Barbarism is thus the 
law's ab initio as well as its other, but always outside the gates 
(dehors the text). Maintaining this narrative of law's innocence as a 
function of the law against genocide means that we repose in the 
law the relinquishment of an apparent contradiction of the nation 
as indexed by the violence (barbarism) that inaugurates, attends, 
and perpetuates the nation-state, and the rule of law itself. 
The originary framing of genocide depends upon a cordon 
sanitaire. The conception requires a moral boundary that 
essentializes the difference between "them" and "us." The original 
conception of genocide as new law is thus invested with an 
"inherent" moral authority that is backed by the power of the 
nation-state's own discourse on violence, and vice versa. In this 
sense, the legal conception is disciplinary, following the dictates of 
formal or positive legal analysis and reform. It is not critical, in the 
sense of an awareness that the marginal but conventional tropes, 
metaphors, categories and elements of meaning reassert the 
problems that attend the disciplinary conceptualization of violence: 
the problem, for instance, of a suppressed reinscription of the law's 
own violence. 
None of this, of course, is to critique Lemkin's own efforts— 
quite the contrary. In the midst of total war and massive human 
destruction and suffering, Lemkin's innovation reflects a deep faith 
in the human capacity for transcendence. But the articulation of 
that faith is, as with all else, historically contingent. As genocide 
inherits its discursive history from the genres of race, imperialism 
and militarism, so too the post-war discourse on genocide subtends 
the genealogy of the term's original conceptualization. The central 
argument of this article involves what this means for how we think 
of and deploy genocide as a legal term of art. 
This, then, is the frame within which genocide is conceived in 
the mid-twentieth century. Modern history begins with the nation-
state; therefore genocide as "ethnocide" is the violence of 
extermination perpetrated within modern history. At the same time, 
genocide as reversion to ancient barbarism is a discursive irruption 
within the narrative stasis of state (legal) discourse. Thus, within 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the story of a severance between the nation-state and genocidal 
violence, the normative frame cannot contain this irruption, which 
threatens to spill out and eradicate the border. The legal 
signification of genocide indexes a desire for containment and the 
need for a fixed (inherent) moral borderline between the "self' of 
the nation-state and the violence of the self suppressed and 
displaced onto the barbaric foreigner. This element of 
containment—including, as I hope to show in the following, the 
containment and control of disciplinarity as such (the discipline of 
genocide knowledge and discourse)—constitutes a principal 
characteristic of the discourse on genocide as, following Lemkin, a 
legal category and a legal event. 
Thus far, I have attempted to understand the initial conception 
of genocide both through what Lemkin says in his text and what he 
implies within the tropes and metaphors he deploys to express his 
intention. This intention is both conventional and disciplinary with 
respect to the overlapping terrains of law, politics, and morality. 
Whilst the text of Axis outlines the elements and criteria to define 
the "new" crime of genocide, the marginal framework for 
conceptualizing the violence invokes and (re)animates old 
narratives and ideas about race, imperialism, tribe, blood, myth, 
and identity. The (inter)textual projection is true to a discipline of 
law (positive law) as the vehicle for categorizing and controlling 
the relationship between these older strains or narratives and 
modern, "technified" violence. Hence, the legal conception of 
genocide imagines the law itself as a border that protects the 
subject, within the present, from the suppressed intimations of its 
own violence. In effect, within this initial formulation, the subject 
as index of the nation-state is incapable, innately and essentially, of 
perpetrating the (modern) form of an atavistic violence 
conceptualized as genocide. As such, the legal conception suggests 
a disciplinary reading of violent conflict and the reformist 
ambitions of law. 
As a specific, historical intervention within the larger juridical 
discourse on violence, the text and its subtexts disclose how the 
law operates, and is deployed, in relation to massive violent events 
that precipitate the search for new forms of expression and legal 
control. In effect, the conception of genocide as a legal event 
discloses the meaning of law itself, both in its self-reflection as an 
ex post form of knowledge about the world, and through critique as 
an ex ante disciplinary operation that creates and polices the world 
through the event it construes as juridical. 
Thus, the original conception of genocide involves at its core 
the idea of law as an operation to separate, suppress, and police the 
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boundary between humans arranged on a political and moral grid. 
The metaphor that captures this sense of law is that of the border. 
The law is the border that performs three disciplinary operations in 
relation to violence. First, the border specifies a distinction 
between a civilized political subject that is not barbarous, i.e., that 
is incapable of militarism, the violence of the other. The border 
encapsulates nonviolence inasmuch as the border, as law, saves the 
other from the other's violence. But the border is a moral 
imposition, anenforcement: it "impels" its moral order and, 
through war, does so in a violent way. The border is itself a form 
of violence. The second operation of the border, then, is to elide 
this element of its own violence by displacement. Violence thus 
displaced, the border has enabled a separation between the subject 
and the object. The third operation of the border is to police that 
separation. In order to effectuate this operation, the border must 
maintain the innocence of the subject (and, as such, the "political 
subjectivity" of the subject is a posit of innocence) by separating 
the subject from any implication in this form of violence, defined 
as genocidal. 
The three aspects of the law as border—separation, 
suppression/displacement, and policing—become evident from a 
discursive analysis of the concept of genocide. But the discourse 
on genocide, including genocide literature, genocide studies, the 
legal and political deployments of and debates around the term, 
and the term's historical and sociological evolution, replicates the 
same tropes and effects of the law as border. Within the larger 
schema, following Edward Said, this operation of law as border, 
i.e., what we do with the term and its meaning irrespective of 
authorial intent, may be a function of "dominating, coercive 
systems of knowledge"26 produced—at specific historical 
moments—by the discursive subject concerning the object, of 
which genocide law as epistemology, as disciplinary legal 
knowledge, is an example. In the next section, the translation of the 
concept of genocide from law to sociology, and from law to 
politics, plays out—and is therefore limited in the same ways by—
the effects of genocide legal discourse as a coercive system of 
knowledge that polices the border between subject and object as 
different categories of the human in relation to violence. 
26 Edward Said, Orientalism Reconsidered, 27 RACE & CLASS 14 (1985) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
42 	 JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW 	 [voL. 3.031 
II. SHAW: GENOCIDE AS WAR 
In the previous section, I analyzed the conceptualization of 
genocide as law, or the production of legal knowledge of violence 
as genocide (genocide discourse), through the metaphor of the 
border whose operation is threefold: separation of kinds or forms 
of knowledge, primarily of the subject from a knowledge of its 
own violence; suppression of this knowledge of violence (and 
displacement of this knowledge onto the genocidal other); and 
policing the separation. The consequence of the policing operation 
of the border is twofold: to keep the subject from knowing itself, 
and to perpetuate the "knowing" of the other as intrinsically 
violent. In other words, the law as border manages a separation 
internal, as it were, to the subject; by maintaining the subject in its 
role as observer of the world, it divorces the subject from the 
capacity to realize its own political subjectivity. As observer of the 
world, the subject maintains its hegemony over the object of the 
discursive operation. Thus, the second consequence of the policing 
operation of the border is to permit the dominance of the subject 
over the object of the discourse: the other is "objectively" 
genocidal and, thereby, precluded from its own access to political 
subjectivity, to subject-hood. 
In the following, I argue that the discursive operation of the 
border as creating a split within the subject and between the 
subject and object of the discourse on genocide extends beyond the 
legal conceptualization of genocide as disclosed within Lemkin's 
original formulation. It extends also to other domains that replicate 
the border's indicia and operation. In other words, it is the 
discourse on genocide, or how we think about violence of this 
kind, and not any particular disciplinary field of inquiry, that 
creates the border and thereby precludes access to political 
subjectivity. To show how this works, as well as to underline its 
preclusive normativity, I turn to a recent book by Martin Shaw, a 
sociologist, that attempts to divorce the conceptualization of 
genocide from its "capture" within law. Because the attempted 
recapture remains disciplinary, it does not escape the discursive 
operation of the border. However, the consequences within the real 
world are serious, as I hope to show in relation to Shaw's analysis 
of the situation in Darfur, Sudan. 
Shaw's recent book, What is Genocide?27, provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the concept of genocide. In some ways 
the book is a watershed: in its critique of the legal discourse on 
27 MARTIN SHAW, WHAT IS GENOCIDE? (2007). 
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genocide, it encapsulates all the thinking within other discursive 
domains—historical, sociological, political, and ethical—from 
Lemkin to the present on the subject of genocide. A principal aim 
of the book is to sever as far as possible genocide's link to the law 
as conceptually definitive of this form of violence. Shaw states: 
"The legal concern with individual responsibility of perpetrators 
meant that legal means were an indirect way of getting at the more 
fundamental issues involved. The constraints of legal standards of 
proof meant that law was hardly the most satisfactory discipline in 
which to come to balanced judgments about historical episodes, let 
alone creative theoretical interpretations."28 He therefore suggests 
that "'genocide' probably has a more promising future as a 
sociological and political than as a legal concept."29 
Shaw's analysis of genocide is disciplinary. My critique of his 
approach will therefore lead to the conclusion that despite Shaw's 
success in moving "genocide" from the domain of positive law to 
the sociological and political domains, the discourse on genocide 
that evolves from this conceptual translation effectuates the same 
result. That is, genocide as a sociological and political concept 
functions discursively as a border, much as did genocide as a legal 
concept: it separates the subject from a "self-knowing" of its own 
violence, suppresses that not-knowing, and polices the threat of its 
return. Indeed, genocide's translation—Shaw considers it a 
return—to the sociological and political domains operates as an 
extension of a legal mandate over a broader classification of 
violence. As such, genocide as a sociological and political concept 
increases the potential for law's violence—manifested, for 
example, in the form of military intervention to prevent and punish 
genocide. It increases the policing apparatus of the discourse on 
genocide. 
For Shaw, genocide is first and foremost a social 
phenomenon—it happens to and within societies—and so its 
proper understanding should be sociological. Shaw posits the 
adoption of "a critical theoretical approach"3° to genocide: the first 
part of his book is historical analysis, the second attempts to 
"understand the main terms of genocide debates in the light of 
sociological theory; how we should develop social theory itself to 
take account of genocide's challenges; and how we should begin 
the task of explanation."3I His aim is to clarify a conception of 
28 Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). 
29 Id. (emphasis in original). 
30 Id. at 13. 
31 Id. 
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genocide that is "relevan[t] for anti-genocidal action."32 In the 
result, Shaw attempts to wrest the concept of genocide from law 
and relocate it firmly within sociology and politics because these 
domains are more instrumental to understanding, and therefore 
preventing, genocide. 
For this task he turns to Lemkin. Shaw reads Lemkin through a 
disciplinary lens: the original conception of genocide is in fact both 
sociological and legal. Only within its subsequent history did the 
law take over and "capture" the "terms of the genocide debate." 
Shaw's return to Lemkin attempts to resuscitate the sociological 
element of the original conception, and to elaborate further on that 
conception in the light of subsequent historical events and efforts 
at legally reforming the meaning of the term. 
Of Lemkin's definition within Axis, Shaw finds two salient 
aspects to genocidal violence: one is "destruction," the other is 
"killing." The latter is merely one aspect of a concerted whole: 
The nuances of the key word, 'destruction', were 
indicated here by the difference between 
`immediate destruction' of a nation and 'destruction 
of essential foundations' of its life. Lemkin was 
clear that genocide refers generally to the latter; 
`immediate' destruction in the sense of 'mass 
killings of all members of a nation' was a specific 
type but did not define genocide.33  
In short, Shaw takes from Lemkin a sociological conception of 
genocide: "Genocide, like barbarity, was a comprehensive concept 
of the social destruction of national groups, and Lemkin believed 
that it had very wide applicability."34 
Unfortunately, "[w]hile Lemkin offered a socio-historical 
conception of genocide, his conceptualization was heavily 
influenced by the legal tradition."35 Shaw finds that this influence 
narrows the meaning and thereby creates problems for the 
conception and meaning of genocide. For instance, 
[b]oth Nuremberg and the Convention laid stronger 
emphasis than Lemkin on physical and biological 
destruction, and less on broader social destruction. 
This difference is largely explicable because the 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 19 (emphasis in original). 
34 Id. at 21 (emphasis in original). 
35 Id. at 23. 
A 
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former were designed to apply and define genocide 
law: killing and physical harm were the sharpest 
ends of the destructive processes and thus obvious 
legal foci.36 
With the creation of the new law to criminalize this newly 
conceptualized violence, the sociological aspect of the 
phenomenon gets left behind. Shaw catalogues and analyzes the 
genocide literature37 that both recognizes and bemoans this 
discursive loss, since it represents a loss of understanding in the 
meaning of genocide and, with it, the capacity to properly act 
against genocidal violence. 
Shaw must do three things in order to resuscitate and vindicate 
a broader, socio-political conception of genocide. First, he must 
find, as noted above, that the sociological and political meanings of 
the term precede the legal meaning: they are more originary, 
thereby laying claim to greater epistemological authority. Second, 
since it was "first"38 within law that genocide was clearly defined, 
Shaw must show how law is less faithful (and by implication less 
authoritative) than the sociological and the political to 
understanding the violence of genocide. Shaw does this by 
integrating law to theory, in a broad sense, and characterizing both 
as ideal forms of knowledge. As such, they are deemed less 
relevant to the search for practical, instrumental forms of 
knowledge to counter the scourge of genocide. The dethroning of 
law (and theory) toward the development of an anti-genocidal 
knowledge is hastened also through the linkage, even fusion, 
between legal meaning and the perpetrator's perspective.39 
The third thing Shaw must do in order to vindicate a socio-
political and, thereby, a broader definition extends from the first 
two gestures: not only is a socio-political conception more 
36 Id. at 22. 
37 The list of scholars includes most of the well-known names in genocide 
studies, such as Helen Fein, Barbara Harff, V. Dadrian, Michael Levene, Israel 
Charny and Ben Kiernan in sociology. In law, Shaw mainly depends upon the 
studies of William Schabas and Michael Mann. 
38 SHAW, supra note 27, at 7. ("[I]t was in law that genocide had first been 
defined (by Lemkin and the Genocide Convention) and it was in the legal field 
that the most urgent challenges of new episodes were felt.") 
39 Id. at 4 ("Above all, this book argues that genocide studies are stuck at the 
preliminary stage of concept formation, defining genocide primarily in terms of 
the 'intentions' of the 'perpetrators,' rather than looking at the structure of 
conflict within which attempts to destroy populations and groups are played out. 
I aim, therefore, to construct a more sociologically adequate concept of genocide 
."). 
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authoritative (as originary), it is also more useful; that is, Shaw 
must assert the superiority of instrumental over abstract and 
philosophical knowledge. Perhaps in part because of this, or 
because of his dependence upon a social-scientific framework to 
the exclusion of a critique or knowledge of its own foundations4°— 
to the exclusion of a critical self-knowing of the sociological 
subject—his ethical and prescriptive conclusions, as I hope to 
show, fall prey to the problems of disciplinarity, of coercive 
hegemonic knowledge, outlined above with respect to the original 
legal conception of the term. In short, Shaw concludes his 
sociological and political conception of genocide, through 
genocide's amalgamation with war, in what Said calls a subjective 
and disciplinary "statement of power"  in relation to the objects of 
genocide. 
The first move in the dethroning of law42 is to suggest that it is 
primarily concerned with death and, as such, is opposed to a 
political-sociological view of genocide that is primarily concerned 
with destruction. The difference Shaw draws is between individual 
death and social destruction: the latter encompasses the former, 
and the former is merely one, albeit extreme and pervasive, aspect 
of a social conflict described as genocide. Also, genocide is a 
social event that implicates political conflicts and fractures; the 
law's fixation on death is a criminal matter and its paradigm is the 
murder of the individual. From this essential error, law reveals 
4°  On the human sciences more generally, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER 
OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (LES MOTS ET LES 
CHOSES) 345-46 (Vintage Books 1973) (1966) ("Hence that double and 
inevitable contestation: that which lies at the root of the perpetual controversy 
between the sciences of man and the sciences proper—the first laying an 
invincible claim to be the foundation of the second, which are ceaselessly 
obliged in turn to seek their own foundation, the justification of their method, 
and the purification of their history, in the teeth of `psychologism,' 
`sociologism,' and 'historicism'; and that which lies at the root of the endless 
controversy between philosophy, which objects to the naïveté with which the 
human sciences try to provide their own foundation, and those same human 
sciences which claim as their rightful object what would formerly have 
constituted the domain of philosophy."). 
On the origins of one human science, history, see also Said, supra note 26, 
at 11. ("[I]n the methodological assumptions and practice of world history—
which is ideologically anti-imperialist–little or no attention is given to those 
cultural practices, like Orientalism or ethnography, affiliated with imperialism, 
which in genealogical fact fathered world history itself.") 
41 Said, supra note 26, at 8. 
42 SHAW, supra note 27, at 27 ("While law often informs as well as reflects social 
debate, it is highly unusual for a major concept to be so strongly defined by a 
legal document. Thus moving out of the restrictive legal framework is a major 
issue for the sociology of genocide."). 
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itself to be insufficient to provide "a complex, situational 
account9943 of genocide, specifically genocidal intent. 
The second move, the isolation of law from the socio-political 
domain—and indeed, all subsequent moves—flows from this 
original error. The separation of law from the political is 
articulated in two modes: first, the severance of genocide from war 
(and law's integration of genocide to the individual murder 
paradigm); and, related to that, the distinction between specific and 
general intention. Shaw notes that "[t]he most striking fact about 
the process that produced the [Genocide] Convention was its 
separation of genocide from war."44 What Shaw understands this to 
mean is that the law on genocide is radically severed from an 
engagement with social processes as such, and is only concerned 
with the result. War stands in for the political domain, the polis and 
its procedures, conflicts, evolutions, and so on; law stands outside 
this political and social dimension in its fixation on the end result 
of these processes. Law sees this end through the lens of 
"intentionality"; hence, the third move from the moment of error is 
in the separation between what law means by "intent" and what the 
political dimension means by "intent." 
Law's paradigm, then, is the individual murder case. Applied 
to a multilayered event such as genocide, the law so 
conceptualized is inadequate. The core of Shaw's argument for this 
inadequacy is in the legal requirement that the perpetrator of 
genocide, like the murderer, be proven to have the criminal mens 
rea, the state of mind—knowledge and intention—to commit the 
crime. "However," Shaw cautions, "the legal understanding of 
`intent' is narrow: the reference to 'intent' in the text indicated that 
the prosecution needed to go beyond establishing that the offender 
meant to engage in the conduct, or to cause the consequence. The 
offender must also be shown to possess a 'specific intent' (dolus 
specialis)."45 Shaw notes that "[c]riminal law presumes that an 
individual intends the consequences of his or her acts, in effect 
deducing the existence of the mens rea from proof of the physical 
act itself."46 Shaw suggests further that "the legal idea moves 
43 Id. at 84 (noting that the "intent" requirement of law is too "singular" and thus 
demands a complex, situational account to give it meaning). 
44 
 Id. at 28. 
45 Id. at 82 (emphasis in original). 
46 Id. at 83. 
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`intent' beyond its ordinary meaning, in ways that unnecessarily 
restrict understanding."47 Furthermore, Shaw notes, 
[t]he emphasis on intention inherited from 
international law derived originally from the fact 
that genocide was seen in the same way as war 
crimes, which were recodified at Geneva around the 
same time as the Genocide Convention was drafted. 
The idea of intentionality in genocide follows that 
of 'wilful intent' in war." 
As such, given the necessity for proof, Shaw suggests that, 
[t]ypes of acts that constitute genocide—killing and 
other harm against civilians—also occur in war, 
where they may not always be criminal, or, if they 
are, they may be [sic] easily be seen as war crimes 
or crimes against humanity. This is another reason 
why the law of genocide has been encumbered with 
the idea of 'special intent.'49 
The special intent requirement of law as a narrowing of 
genocide's meaning does two things: it represents "only 
perpetrators' intentions" and avoids an understanding of genocide 
as, following Weber, the subjective "`meaning-complexes' of 
genocidal action."5° That is, the legal conception of genocide takes 
genocide out of its political context, outside of war. In effect, Shaw 
suggests that, "[t]he prevailing idea of genocide—action informed 
by an intention to destroy social groups as such—is precisely a 
pure, ideal-typical representation of the subjective meaning 
involved in a general class of actions."51 This "ideal" of the 
rationale for genocide takes only one point of view, whereas the 
sociological view would be more relational: "A sociologically 
adequate concept of genocide needs to build understandings of 
types of action and relationships into a general account. This will 
take us still further from the subjective meaning for perpetrators."52 
47 He continues: "This tight concept of intention is sometimes reinforced by 
sociologically unrealistic concepts of collective intention." SHAW, supra note 27, 
at 83. 
48 Id. at 84. 
" Id. at 85. 
s() Id. at 86. 
51 Id. at 87. 
52 Id. at 91. 
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As such, a more complex relational picture of genocide would 
include the subjective meanings of victims as well as bystanders. 
Citing to Weber, Shaw notes that, "[t]he term 'social relationship' 
will be used to denote the behaviour of a plurality of actors in so 
far as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of 
that of the others and is oriented in these terms."53 Hence, 
"[r]ecognizing the relational character of genocide moves us 
towards an account of the kind of structure that it involves."54 
By "structure," Shaw understands the "recurring patterns of 
social action. . . reproduced . . . . Genocide is therefore a structural 
phenomenon in the sense that it is a recurring pattern of social 
conflict, characterized by particular kinds of relationships between 
actors, and with typical connections to other conflict structures in 
society."55 In short, genocide is a kind of war.56 Shaw makes this 
explicit ("genocide's character as 'conflict' and `war,'"57) in his 
"more precise sociological definition: genocide is not only a form 
of social conflict, but also a form of war."58 He notes that, "[t]he 
difference [between genocide and typical war] lies in the 
construction of civilian groups as enemies, not only in a social or 
political but also in a military sense, to be destroyed. Genocide," 
therefore, "remains as Lemkin first categorized it, an extreme form 
of war that departs from the ideal-typical form of war in this 
fundamental sense."59 
Shaw extends Lemkin's original formulation by, in essence, 
amalgamating genocide to war. He suggests that "modern warfare, 
in both its interstate and guerrilla-counterinsurgency forms, should 
be seen as degenerate war,"60 whereupon genocide is a further 
projection of this form of war. Ostensibly there is a distinction 
between genocide and war: in modern warfare, "the 'enemy' 
civilian population was targeted as a means towards the defeat of a 
53 Id. at 94 (citing MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION 118). 
54 SHAW, supra note 27, at 95. 
55 Id. at 96. 
56 Id. at 36 ("War involves political, economic and ideological as well as military 
power; so too genocide. Physical destruction is the ultimate manifestation of the 
destructive process of war, but it is not what is going on most of the time in most 
wars; so too in genocides. Thus genocide, like war, involves much more than the 
mass killing through which we most easily recognize its destructiveness. Just as 
war can occur without large-scale killing, genocide too can occur where this 
element is not extensively carried out."). 
57 Id. at 96. 
58 Id. at 111.  
" Id. 
6° Id. 
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state and army" (hence, Dresden or Hiroshima are properly 
understood under "the rubric of war,"61). However, in contrast, 
genocide "constructs unarmed civilian populations as the objects 
in their own right, of the types of armed violence normally applied 
only to armed enemies."62 Despite this distinction and the 
analytical importance of distinguishing between genocide and war, 
Shaw notes: 
Yet it is also important to understand the usually 
intimate relationships between these different types 
of campaign. War and genocide are often woven 
together in the same campaign, so that, to describe 
it as a whole, it is inadequate to talk only of 'war' 
or of 'genocide'. Instead, we need to use the 
concept of genocidal war that I introduced above: 
two distinct types of policy integrated in a single 
campaign. "63  
What is the meaning of this amalgamation of genocide and 
war? It has required Shaw to attenuate and then sever the link 
between genocide and law, first by locating genocide's legal 
origins within the laws of war and then by specifying law's 
fixation on death (only one of several consequences of genocide 
understood as social conflict), and intentionality (specific with 
respect to only one party to genocidal conflict) as productive of an 
"ideal-typical" knowledge of the genocide perpetrator that leaves 
incomplete an apprehension of genocide's relational aspects, i.e., 
genocide as political conflict. It has required him, then, to make a 
distinction between law as an atomistic, or individuating, form of 
knowledge, and war, which is part of the relational, political 
process. In a sense, law is purified of "genocidal violence," in the 
way law is conceptualized to posit a certain kind of "ideal" 
knowledge of the violence. Violence is the purview of the political 
process: the decision to wage war, the policy to attack civilians 
either as combatants or "as such" (genocidal acts of war). 
What, then, is Shaw's conceptualization of the political as 
such? Violence pervades the category of the political; the question 
becomes one of hierarchy. And it is within the development of a 
hierarchy of political violence that Shaw submits a hierarchy of 
violators, so to speak. Thus, genocide (genocidal war) is endemic 
61 Id. at 111-12. 
62 M. at 112. 
M 11 at 148. 
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to some societies, whereas other societies are incapable of this 
form of violence.64 Within Lemkin's subtext, the separation of 
genocidal and non-genocidal polities is rationalized within a legal 
conception. With Shaw, the same separation occurs, and is in fact 
reinforced and policed, within the political domain. I have argued 
that the original legal conception was disciplinary, inasmuch as it 
projected the operation of a border (separation, 
suppression/displacement, and policing) between the subject and 
the object of genocide. Here also, Shaw's sociological and political 
conception of genocide performs the same operation: that of a 
border that separates and hierarchizes genocide's subject-observer 
and object. This suggests that the integration of genocide within 
the political, viz. genocide as war, involves a specific 
conceptualization of the political domain itself. 
Shaw's idea of the political ratifies a division within the world 
between genocidal and non-genocidal geopolitical regions. Shaw 
defines genocide as "acts" of violence, to escape from the 
emphasis (at law) of the perpetrator's intent: "we also need the 
concept of genocidal action (or genocide as action, a sense closer 
to previous understandings)...Thus genocide is a type of unequal 
social conflict between two sets of actors, which is defined 
primarily by the type of action carried out by the more powerful 
side."65 By insisting upon political conflict within his definition, he 
escapes or takes a "radical break"66 from the "ideas of 'one-
sidedness' and 'helplessness'°  characteristic of other definitions. 
But paradoxically, because his approach "gives genocide a 
broader scope than is often allowed" by defining genocide as "not 
restricted to a very few big, successful mass murders," it is also 
more ubiquitous within some societies than others and "[i]t is, 
lamentably, more common than those preoccupied with the 
peculiarities of the Holocaust imagine."68 In the result, genocide as 
war—especially the "total war" model—first eliminates law and its 
fixation on mass death, the "big" event. Second, war in the 
developed West has been largely abolished, and with it, genocide 
(or genocidal actions): "Ethnic conflicts are rarely very violent 
within the West not only because democracy has been normalized, 
but also because state power has been internationalized and 
interstate wars abolished."69 Where the West does engage in war it 
64 Id. at 135, 158-62. 
65 Id. at 154. 
66 Id. at 155. 
67 1d.  
68 Id. at 157. 
64 
 Id. at 59. 
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is not genocidal." Third, war (total war) is pervasive within the 
South: "In contrast, deep, institutionalized, internationalized 
pacification has hardly developed in non-Western regions: major 
`nation-states' are quasi-imperial and this is why their 'imperial 
fringes' are dangerous. The way of war envisaged by major non-
Western states remains much closer to total war . . . ."71  
Shaw's conceptions both of genocide as war and of war as 
social conflict within which occurs a collection of actions (some 
genocidal, some not, depending upon "specific combinations in 
particular cases")72, enable both a more pervasive model of 
genocide and its specification as normative to certain political 
arrangements or geopolitical realities. The border-metaphor applies 
to the division between political arrangements. Essentially, the 
border is the return of the law, to wit: "since genocide is an 
illegitimate variety of the generally legitimate social activity of 
war, understanding genocide in this way enables us to see the 
connections—as well as the difference—between this kind of anti-
civilian violence and the more common kind perpetrated both 
intentionally and unintentionally in warfare."73  
The metaphor of the border-operation suggests that Shaw's 
understanding of the political domain as such is on a continuum of 
violence. The border (law) separates states and regions and 
suppresses a "self-knowledge," so to speak, of the potential 
violence of the Western subject—a sense of the continuum of 
violence itself, between objective manifestation (actions) "out 
there" and subjective power arrangements and surveillance over 
here. Finally, the border polices the political division between 
regions by specifying a distinction between an "active" (violent) 
South, and a passive-observatory North. 
Pushing the border metaphor further, this policing operation is 
not inconsequential with respect to the subject: the border 
separates the subject itself from its own "political subjectivity," its 
own access to subjecthood. As such, while it must be said that 
Shaw's sociological and political conception of genocide is both 
comprehensive, intuitive, and thus persuasive as an empirical 
account of genocidal violence within the last century, his analysis 
hinges upon a conception of the political category that denies 
access to political subjectivity for both subject and object. The 
observer's role in relation to wars, thanks to "[w]estern global 
dominance, market and production integration, international law 
7° Id. at 158 ("new US-led occupations are not genocidal."). 
71 Id. at 159. 
72 1d at 156. 
73 
 Id. at 154. 
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and mass media,"74 is one of "global surveillance."75 This role is 
antithetical to "genocidal actions," and ostensibly "inhibits" 
wars.
76 The implication of the "surveillance mechanism"77 as a 
passive or at best benign78 enterprise—it inhibits interstate wars, it 
benefits victims—also impliedly separates the observer from the 
potentiality of violence, as it were, inherent to the gaze. This is an 
element of the separation of the subject from its own political 
subjectivity, its own sense, if you will, that surveillance is active 
and constructive. Shaw concedes only that the West's passive 
surveillance or benign intervention may inadvertently have an 
effect on those under the gaze, or those who receive it: "in reality, 
life risks are transferred to them," i.e., to the "Southern war-zone 
civilians."79 
In the result, Shaw's conception of the political coheres with 
what might be considered a normative perspective on how Western 
power conceives of itself: according to its own disciplinary 
practices and the production of knowledge about violence within 
the world. For instance, Shaw notes—in response to Michel 
Foucault's theory of bio-power (modern sovereign exercises a right 
of death through the "function of administering life,"80)—that, 
"[g]enocide is practised by regimes and armed groups that hardly 
have totalitarian ambitions or capabilities; conversely, today's 
Western states certainly 'manage life' but they do not practise 
genocide."8I It is the way we think of the world, the way we see it; 
genocide is not simply a problem of totalitarianism or fascism, but 
of failed, rogue, degenerate states, non-states, and non-state actors. 
Genocide discourse where, as here, the concept of genocide is 
sociological and political rather than legal, ratifies the normative 
sense of this world view. 
74 Id. at 159. 
75 
 Id. at 160. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. ("The twenty-first-century context of war is one of global surveillance, by 
Western states, the United Nations system, non-governmental organizations and 
social movements, all working through and reflected in global networks of 
media coverage."). 
78 At worst, "[e]ven where international intervention is substantial, it may often 
become part of the conditions for genocide. Proto-genocidists may see 
international pressure for power-sharing as a threat, prompting drastic action 
against 'enemy' groups, as in Rwanda." SHAW, supra note 27, at 160. 
Notice how this mutes any active role attributable to the observer. Compare this 
passive view with, for example, ANDREW WALLIS, SILENT ACCOMPLICE: THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF FRANCE'S ROLE IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2006). 
79 SHAW, supra note 27, at 159. 
80 Id. at 135. 
Id. 
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Indeed, the conception of this world view, within Shaw's 
schema, as norm becomes evident in the challenge posed to the 
view by the theory of bio-power posited by Foucault. Furthermore, 
its normativity—i.e., that this view seems "obvious" to us—is 
reinforced by the return of law; purified of its own violence, law 
authorizes and legitimates the political conception of the world as 
conceived within a socio-political discourse on genocide through 
the disaggregation of "legitimate" and "illegitimate" war. 
Foucault enters Shaw's text like a rupture of the surface 
normativity of genocide discourse and is quickly cauterized and 
removed. This is because Foucault offers an alternative conception 
of the political category as such. Shaw looks to Foucault for the 
answer to specific questions: "Are there general reasons why the 
phenomenon of genocide has developed? Can certain features 
provide the principal elements of explanation for all particular 
episodes?" Shaw concludes with: "In what follows I evaluate 
explanatory frameworks bearing in mind these questions . . . ."82 
Shaw finds unhelpful, however, Foucault's theory of modern 
power and why it should have led to the occurrence of genocide. 
"For Foucault," he notes, 
genocide represented a manifestation of modern 
bio-power, reflecting the fact that 'life and its 
mechanisms' had been brought 'into the realm of 
explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an 
agent of transformation of human life.' The 
corollary of the state's management of life forces 
was a new management of death: 'One might say 
that the ancient right to take life or let live was 
replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to 
the point of death.' 83  
Shaw then notes: "Foucault had clearly absorbed the experiences 
of total war and totalitarian genocide."84 Shaw's next citation to 
Foucault underlines both the integration of genocide with modern 
war85 and the link within the bio-political sovereign between the 
power over life and over death, to wit: "'massacres have become 
vital . . . the existence in question is no longer the juridical 
existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a 
82 Id at 133. 
83 Id. at 134 (citations omitted). 
84 Id 
85 Id. ("Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be 
defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone . . . 
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population . . . :"86 There, however, Shaw and Foucault part ways, 
and it is at the level of conceptualizing the political that they seem 
to disagree. 
First, Shaw reproduces the passage in Foucault that contains 
the only instance in which Foucault makes a "direct mention of 
genocide."87 It is both an interesting passage and the locus of 
Shaw's interpretation of Foucault and, by extension, his own 
definition of the political as such: "Ii]f genocide is indeed the 
dream of modern powers,'" writes Foucault, 'this is not because 
of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is 
situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and 
the large-scale phenomena of population. "'88  Recall Shaw's 
questions posed in the first instance to Foucault and others in the 
section of the book entitled "Explanations." Shaw seeks a kind of 
knowledge about genocide that will explain its source: what, 
empirically, objectively, can we locate as the "general reasons" for 
the occurrence of genocide? Does Foucault's theory of biopower 
help in this regard? Shaw finds that Foucault's theory does no 
more than locate the source of genocide within totalitarianism and 
the instantiation, within modernity, of "total war."89 Furthermore: 
Foucault's explanation that genocide is the 
other side of the modern state's "function of 
administering life," replacing capital and 
corporal punishment with correction, seems 
insufficient. Why should state forms that 
increasingly eschew capital punishment 
resort to the "orgies" of destruction and 
murder that characterize genocide? 
Foucault's relatively unexamined idea of 
genocide appears over-influenced by 
particular pseudo-scientific, eugenic strands 
of genocidal thought and the exceptionally 
rationalized murder of the extermination 
camps.90 
As such, since genocide perpetration has not empirically been 
limited to totalitarian states or leaders, and since "Western states 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 134. 
88 Id. (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME I: AN 
INTRODUCTION 137 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1978)). 
89 Id. 
99 Id. at 135. 
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certainly 'manage life' but they do not practice genocide," Shaw 
concludes that "Foucault's linkages were suggestive but they 
didn't explain the rise of genocide or why genocides are 
initiated."91  
Although Foucault discusses the nature of modern war and 
links it to genocide, his language intimates a different conception 
of the political than that suggested by Shaw's analysis. In the 
above passage where he mentions the word genocide, Foucault 
calls it the "dream of modern powers," not the right (of the 
sovereign) to kill that is "the reverse of the right of the social body 
to ensure, maintain, or develop its life."92 Furthermore, in a 
passage immediately preceding the "genocide" quotation, Foucault 
notes that, as with atomic warfare, "the power to expose a whole 
population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an 
individual's continued existence."93 I read this to mean not the 
"other side," detached and other to the "function of administering 
life"94 but, rather, continuous with that function, its legitimating 
basis. The idea of genocide as an underwriting exposure 
legitimates power "exercised at the level of life, the species, the 
race, and the large-scale phenomena of population."95  
Shaw is right that Foucault's analysis is "general" (he 
dismisses it as "too general,"96) and "suggestive."97 There is 
something generalizing, immanent, and pervasive about a 
conception of violence, in relation to power (its underside), not as 
ideologically specific, but as fragmentary and as hard to locate as a 
dream or an exposure. This is language that speaks to the systemic 
relationship between power and violence, and of the knowledge 
this relationship produces. It speaks less to a description of 
genocide as specific actions, to what Shaw describes as a 
"manifestation of the general 'power over life'."98 As such, the 
reduction of Foucault to explanatory causes and effects (his 
linkages do not "explain the rise of genocide or why genocides are 
initiated"99)—to an idea of genocide limited to the "total wars" of 
recent history and the manifestations of ideology (totalitarianism), 
to genocidal violence as 'orgies' of destruction and murder"113°— 
91 Id. 
FoucAuLT, supra note 88, at 137-38. 
93 Id. at 137. 
94 Id. at 138. 
95 Id. at 137. 
96 SHAW, supra note 27, at 135. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 134. 
99 Id 
loo Id 
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says, in effect, that as disciplinary knowledge, Foucault's theory 
fails. This failure is further underlined by suggesting that 
Foucault's political formulations on the relationshipbetween 
power and violence are based upon pseudo-science1 1 and are 
"over-rationalized." 102 
But it is precisely as non- or failed-disciplinary knowledge, or 
as a form of knowledge critical of disciplinarity, that Foucault's 
theory intervenes within the discourse on genocide. As Foucault 
puts it, 
If there is one approach that I do reject, however, it 
is that (one might call it, broadly speaking, the 
phenomenological approach) which gives absolute 
priority to the observing subject, which attributes a 
constituent role to an act, which places its own point 
of view at the origin of all historicity—which, in 
short, leads to a transcendental consciousness. It 
seems to me that the historical analysis of scientific 
discourse should, in the last resort, be subject, not to 
a theory of the knowing subject, but rather to a 
theory of discursive practice.1°' 
Foucault's point of departure is not, then, what he as observing 
subject "sees"—violence on this scale is "totalitarian"1°4—but 
rather "the rules that come into play in the very existence of such 
discourse,"1°5 i.e., the form of thought behind the disciplinary 
knowledge produced by the scientist (sociologist, in this case). 
Seen in this light, Shaw's reduction of Foucault's approach to a 
failed disciplinary knowledge or conception of genocide seems 
more clearly an instance of the separation, suppression and 
policing—by the discourse on genocide—of the ways it is possible 
to know genocide. And this policing operation is in fact normative 
to the discourse; it is one of the "rules of formulation."1°6 Thus, 
Shaw argues for the sociological and political conceptions of 
genocide as normative to how we know what genocidal violence 
is. In effect, genocide is (normatively) a political and sociological 
problem, and the sociological and political forms of knowledge, 
these particular human sciences, are "normative" in relation to 
1°1 Id. at 135. 
102 Id. at 136. 
103 FOUCAULT, supra note 40, at xiv. 
1"4 SHAW, supra note 27, at 135. 
I()5 FOUCAULT, supra note 40, at xiv. 
1°6 Id. at xi. 
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genocidal violence. So if one thinks of knowledge as a kind of 
geographical terrain, with "genocide" and "the political" 
superimposed upon one another, the question is: how much of the 
one covers the other? More to the point: how does the discourse—
the ways we think and speak about genocide—construct the 
overlap between the political and the violence described as 
genocidal? 
Genocide, Shaw insists, is a non-Western phenomenon. And 
yet, the West is "political" in the broad sense. Thus, genocidal 
violence ("degenerate"1°7 war) and the West ("legitimate" war) 
subtend along a plane of the discursive understandings of violence. 
Along the political spectrum, genocide represents degenerate, 
failed, or indeed the non- or apolitical "object." It is only at this 
end of the spectrum that Foucault's theory of bio-power as the 
management of life has value for Shaw. In short, according to the 
metaphor of superimposed terrains, genocide is dehors the 
political. It sits at the end of a theoretical political continuum but is 
in fact merely a simulacrum of the political. This is the construct of 
the political as posited by the discourse on genocide, in its socio-
political amalgamation to war. It is this concept of the political that 
is normative, whereupon the political "subject" is non-genocidal, 
and the genocidal "object" is non- or apolitical. And it is to this 
normative, intuitive concept that Foucault's theory represents a 
break, fusing each end of the spectrum into a single 
conceptualization of the extension of modern (bio-) power, not at 
the level of manifestation but of knowledge: what is known and 
knowable by the ways power and violence are explained, 
articulated, and understood discursively. 
Foucault's theory, in short, challenges the role of the observer 
and, thereby, the subject's distance from the object of observation. 
It brings the ostensibly non-political object of the scientistic, 
sociological gaze into proximity with the political subject-
observer. Shaw's interpretation of Foucault attempts to reassert the 
disjuncture between observer and object. Shaw attempts to reassert 
the norm of an exclusion of this "self-knowledge," whereas 
Foucault's theory attempts to reinsert that knowledge as a 
challenge to normative, scientistic, disciplinary knowledge.1°8 By 
1°7 SHAW, supra note 27, at III.  
108 Id. ("it [i.e., his history of science] describes the unconscious of science. This 
unconscious is always the negative side of science—that which resists it, 
deflects it, or disturbs it. What I would like to do, however, is to reveal a positive 
unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist 
and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and 
seeking to diminish its scientific nature."). 
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showing, albeit in language that is suggestive and somewhat 
elusive (genocide as a "dream"1°9 of power), the linkages between 
subject and object in relation to genocidal violence, his theory 
limits the discursive border and its operations: separation, 
suppression/displacement, and policing. It challenges the 
separation of observer as passive in its surveillance, and of the 
object as active/violent as such ("genocidal actions"). 
Foucault's theory of modern power, including the theory of the 
panopticon, is a direct challenge to this passive construction of 
power's exercise. In a passage that reads remarkably like the flip 
side of Shaw's conception of the political domain as merely 
passive surveillance, Foucault writes: 
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to 
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power. So to arrange things that the 
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is 
discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of 
power should tend to render its actual exercise 
unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus 
should be a machine for creating and sustaining a 
power relation independent of the person who 
exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be 
caught up in a power situation of which they are 
themselves the bearers.' ° 
I read the "inmates" as both subject and object of surveillance, 
with similar effects of power produced in both by the border 
operation of the discourse. The point here, though, is not to suggest 
that the theory of the panopticon fits neatly on all fours with the 
whole global terrain under Western surveillance, but that the act of 
surveillance has active and activating effects that, within the 
discourse on genocide, are elided and suppressed. The norm that 
evolves from this suppression posits to us, axiomatically, that we 
within the liberal democracies do not "do" genocide, we merely 
watch from the sidelines. 
In summary, Shaw's amalgamation of genocide to war is an 
attempt in the first instance to produce instrumental knowledge 
about genocide, knowledge that can inform the development of 
1149 SHAW, supra note 27, at 134. 
110 MICHEL FoucAtiLi, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 201 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed. 1979) (1975)). 
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anti-genocide strategy and policy. He removes genocide from law 
by showing law's insufficiency as a conceptual basis for 
understanding genocide. The consequence is threefold: First, 
genocide as war expands the scope of genocidal violence—
"genocide as action"—to a broad swath of forms and 
manifestations of power. Second, the law itself is rethought both as 
free of "genocide" and therefore as freely applicable to the political 
domain as the border dividing legitimate and illegitimate warfare 
and war actions. Third, this division, likewise, applies to the 
political category as such, to divide the world into geopolitical 
regions according to genocidal and non-genocidal manifestations 
of power. The West does not "manifest" its power in a genocidal 
way: its wars are not genocidal. The South, on the other hand, has 
the problem of pervasive genocidal violence; its conflicts are 
marked by frequent genocidal actions. In a word, the South is 
"genocidal." Within this bifurcated schema, the object of genocide 
"acts" (genocidal actions), the subject observes; the former is 
active, the latter passive. 
What is most striking about Shaw's analysis, and therefore the 
reason it is useful for an analysis of how genocide knowledge is 
produced, is that it represents an innovation within the discourse 
on genocide, moving the debate from its "capture" within the 
limitative legal criteria under the Convention and toward a broader, 
more "coherent" sociological conception. And yet the analysis 
constructs the political domain as the mark and the reiteration of 
the discursive operation of the legal discourse; it reinforces an 
"ideal" of law itself as a border that authorizes a political 
disjuncture between subject and object. The law's reduction, 
separation and return also authorizes and legitimates a political 
reduction and separation within the subject itself: the subject is 
constructed as passive in relation to genocidal violence ("genocidal 
actions") out there in the chaotic, apolitical South. The subject's 
political subjectivity therefore is suppressed within this view of 
itself as observer. In the result, the discourse on genocide, both 
within its originary conception of genocide as a legal phenomenon, 
and within its successful reconceptualization as a sociological and 
political form of violence, remains captive to a normative ideal of 
global power as benign and salvific: its exercise "inhibits" the 
violence of the other, and its will is inherently legitimate. The 
subjects of the discourse—we, the observers—are tamed into 
passivity. 
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CONCLUSION 
Genocide discourse centers on the law, both within the original 
formulation of the term by Lemkin and the subsequent definition 
of the term within the Genocide Convention of 1948. The story of 
the law's role in relation to the form of violence defined as 
genocide, however, is more complicated than simply providing a 
basis for definition and, thereby, a framework for subsequent 
debates. The discourse moves from the extreme of a strict and 
narrow understanding of this form of violence to the attempt to 
abandon legal criteria in determining the conceptual parameters 
and the meaning of the term "genocide" in relation to the form of 
violence. 
Within this Article, I have charted three trajectories for the law 
pursuant to the meaning of genocide, or the knowledge of genocide 
produced by legal and nonlegal discourses. First, the law provided 
an originary basis for apprehending the violence. Second, the law 
was understood as merely one of several possible frameworks for 
apprehending the violence: the alternative sociological and 
political conceptualizations of genocide required the excision of 
law, its repudiation as adequate to produce a comprehensive, 
consistent and practical knowledge about genocide. The third 
movement of law was in its return, after the political decision,''' to 
ratify and authorize the political meaning of genocide. Law was 
purified in order to perform an ex post legitimation, i.e., as law in a 
pure sense, freed from ex ante "political constraints."12  
These three movements of law suggest that the discourse on 
genocide, and the object it produces, is inescapably juridical, even 
when the conceptualization of genocide is non-legal as such. 
Shaw's provocative and successful amalgamation of genocide with 
war is just such an attempt, clarifying the lineaments of the 
discourse on genocide beyond its "capture" within the legal 
framework. But just as Shaw's conception of the law's return to 
legitimize the political decision is in a sense a purified idea(l) of 
law, so also the political category is purified, pacified and, 
I I I SHAW, supra note 27, at 170. 
12 • ia (Shaw, following Reeves, suggests that the Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur report was flawed on both the facts and the law: "The commission's 
factual distortions and logical failures could only be evidence, Reeves 
concluded, of the political constraints under which they were working." As such, 
law must be severed from the analysis of genocidal violence: "Clearly legal 
decisions will always have to be made on the basis of the Convention and its 
case law, but political decisions, at national and international levels, must 
respond to the ideas of genocide that are held within world society."). 
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counterintuitively, depoliticized. The domain of the political is 
severed from the domain of genocidal violence; the former is 
agentic, the latter is not. The former is cast as observer, as a power 
of global surveillance, as delinked from genocidal violence, which 
occurs at the end limit of the political spectrum. 
I have suggested that this movement of separation is also one 
of suppression: that the gaze of the observer, like Foucault's 
panopticon, is not passive but in fact constructive—even violent. 
This element, or self-knowledge, is both suppressed and policed by 
the discourse on violence. The policing ensures the denial of 
access to "the political," the subjectivity of the object of genocide. 
But it has the corollary effect of denying self-knowledge to the 
observer, i.e., access, for the subject, to its own political 
subjectivity. The passive subject cannot "act" within the world 
except as observer, because its active role in the construction of the 
world is denied by the discursive framework within which it sees 
the effects of its gaze only as the (objective) manifestations, or 
actions, of the other. 
In the final analysis, and toward the point of this exercise, the 
depoliticizing of both law and politics has the effect of increasing 
the level of violence in the world and arrogating, to only one side, 
the concept of sovereignty. This is the dangerous consequence of 
the discourse on genocide and its border-operation. The 
amalgamation of genocide to war is in fact only to illegitimate war, 
degenerate and other to the warfare of the (Western) subject. Thus, 
both the legal and the political categories are purified of genocidal 
violence by the discursive segregation of this form of violence to 
the outside, away from the North. 
Whereas law returns to authorize the political decision, the 
latter is operative, within the discourse on genocide, as 
observation, as description, and as passive in relation to genocide. 
In effect, the political decision as "objective" observation is 
purified of political subjective content. The result is that genocide 
becomes pervasive, requiring ever more vigilant surveillance. 
Shaw concludes: "[ijf a broader, more sociologically coherent 
conception becomes accepted not just in academia, but in public 
debate, then decisions about intervention (political and 
humanitarian as well as legal and military) in genocidal crises will 
be less easily avoided by confusing legal references."'" Once 
terrorist attacks become "genocidal massacres"114 and "counter- 
3 /d. (emphasis in original). 
"4 Id. at 162. 
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insurgency war" is collapsed into "genocidal war,"115 the 
geopolitical border is policed not simply by a passive and anxious 
gaze, but by an increase in redemptive, "legitimate" violence: 
saving the object from itself. Under this discursive schema, the 
law's return is also the return of the sovereign as immanent use of 
force. 
115 Id. at 171. 
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